third time's a charm?

So today I was just thinking that perhaps I should start a blog. Then I remembered that I have one, which has lain derelict for a number of years. Though I would choose a different color scheme if I had it all to do over again, it's charming to leave it how it is as an ironic commentary on the melancholy of those days. I'll see if I can get it to play emo music in the background. Anyway, no guarantee I'll really post anything here, though I doubt it matters since I don't think anyone knows it exists. Frankly, this will mostly serve to relieve me of trying to journal, which is rendered unduly challenging and futile by the illegibility of my penmanship.
Anyhow, I've been reading a great deal in these past few days about randomness, which fascinates me beyond measure. I'm just finished The Drunkard's Walk by Leaonard Mlodinow, which solidified my view of the importance of taking into account the chaotic nature of almost all reality. As John Allen Paulos has remarked elsewhere, it is somehow refreshing for me to realize that often the most 'rational' decision is that which takes into account the chaotic and uncertain nature of the possible outcomes, and so in many cases the most 'rational' decision is actually indistinguishable from acting according to blind chance, and it is actually the attempt to control the outcomes precisely which is the least rational.
Additionally, it reminded me of many of Kahneman and Tversky's various "heuristics," which essentially describe the way we are terrible at processing randomness, find patterns when there are none, and attribute causality to cases when it is wholly lacking. This leads to a tendency to value those who succeed, attribute positive outcomes to good decisions, ignore evidence which contradicts our belief while remembering what affirms it, and find retrospective reasons that failure or success, even when determined randomly, were inevitable. I won't bother going into all the interesting details, but suffice it to say that study of some of the research, in addition to a bit of mathematics on random walks and brownian motion, should convince even the most skeptical that the only order we know today is the statistical order derived from an acknowledgment of chaos, and the best maxim we can draw from this knowledge is that in a world governed by chance, the only rational decision is... persistence. Mlodinow wisely concludes with a gem from Thomas Watson, the probabilistic justification of which will not be lost on the mathematically inclined: "If you want to succeed, double your failure rate."

desperate measures

though i lacked the foresight to note this earlier in the summer while creating this historically derelict blog, i will in fact find myself out of immediate contact with most important people in my life for the upcoming semester, and as i have a dreadful fear of exceeding my 'any-time minutes' (due in no small part to the $90 cell-phone bill hastening to my doorstep as i imagine we're speaking), i'm unlikely to have much access to those whom i love on our beloved campus, excepting of course those bold enough to brave the two-block stroll through my impoverished urban neighborhood to reach my dishevelled SRO on the second floor (i plan on being lonely). so here it is. perhaps i'll start writing, and perhaps i'll start advertising the fact, so as to avoid the majority of my collegiate society having to do without my penetrating social critique and philosophical speculation for the next few months. it may additionally furnish me with a sorely lacking sense of relevance.

bedtime stories

today at a mexican market i purchased, for two dollars (a fifteen dollar discount), a volume entitled "the literary companion to sex." it certainly looks promising. the opening quote of the back cover blurbs seems to sum it all up:

what is pornography to one man is the laughter of genius to another
d.h. lawrence

addendum a sapientibus

two solutions to the problem have been suggested. the first was gleaned from a conversation with the sagacious chris griswold, who enjoined me to recall that, according to the fifth evangelist, Clive (Staples Lewis), perhaps the reason we need make entreaty before the throne is simply that "God likes to be asked." this sounds trite, but when converted into tedious metaphysical language may begin to make sense, though i have not as yet deemed it satisfactory.
the second comes from dostoevksy (and what good company he finds himself in), who seems to take my approximate view that prayer really is "just psychological," but that for that very reason the "just" should be removed, as it is in fact the precise purpose of prayer, i.e. that we learn to trust God more and align ourselves with His Will, even though this may have no direct mysterious effect on the future, except insofar as it transforms our souls and makes us more likely to act well and according to mercy in our dealings with others thereafter. Fyodor's Father Zossima puts it plainly:

"Young man, do not be forgetful of prayer. Every time you pray, if your prayer is sincere, there will be new feeling and new meaning in it, which will give you fresh courage, and you will understand that prayer is an education."

on petition

the problem with prayer is that it seems to be, by its very nature, utterly futile. We are adjured to undertake it by sacred writ, and yet an even cursory investigation into its nature seems to leave us bereft of any conception as to how it could be efficacious in anything like the way it is generally (to the best of my knowledge) supposed to be. If it is the case that God's thoughts are "higher than our thoughts" and that "there is no searching into his wisdom," then we must take as a basic premise of Judeo-Chrisian theism (with the appropriate apologies to the Open Theists, who at least have a reason to attempt to persuade God, even if it comes at the cost of the possibility of His not having the power and knowledge requisite for his effectively answering the prayer in question) that God is all-knowing and all powerful. Taken in a weak
sense, this may mean that He knows what He is doing far better than we possibly could, that His judgment is to be trusted above our own, and that He is capable of doing whatever He desires (with the appropriate exception of anything which is analytically contradictory, such as "creating a square circle," although one could argue that no God who is omniscient and benevolent would ever will something so idiotic and trite, and thus the so-called qualification would in fact be redundant, being deducible from the initial proposition). I take as a second premise of Judeo-Christian (more emphatically the latter) theology that God is in some ultimate sense benevolent, loving, magnanimous, or any approximately similar concept which can be defined loosely to imply that He wants for us whatever is best. So our premises are
I) God is omni-(all relevant classical perfections)
II) God is benevolent to an extreme degree (i.e. as benevolent as a being could conceivably be)
Now this is beginning to look as though it's an attempted proof of the impossibility of God's existence, which I grant all start out in a more or less analogous way. I intend no such thing however. It may well be that there is a God who possesses all the aforementioned attributes to the prescribed degrees. The question of prayer then becomes an interesting one. I am to pray to this God and make requests of Him, presumably (if we are to trust recent protestant tradition) requests of a more specific nature than "thy will be done" and "your kingdom come." Something more on the order of "Dear Jesus please cure my puppy's cold" is the sort of request I have in mind. I choose this example not purely for its comic value (though I grant that, for cynics like me, it produces a healthy yield of derision), but rather because it carries with it, for most of us, far less emotional baggage than the actual situations that tend to motivate inquiries into the nature and efficacy of prayer.
The paradox (so i choose to optimistically call it, though i grant that contradiction more fits my own view at present) is the following: if I am requesting something of God, I apparently think that the fulfilling of my request is an event that would increase the general happiness in the world. This is not precisely true, since God may not in the final analysis be a utilitarian (though I would have little problem with it if He proved in fact to be). What we suppose is rather that the
fulfilment of my request would bring about a state of affairs that would make some particular being (oneself, an Other, or God, collective nouns notwithstanding) better in the most general sense possible. This would make prayer a most noble endeavor, as we expended our time entreating our omnipotent Deity to bring things about so as to improve the situation of our
dearly beloved, or even at times of total strangers for whom we have been moved by life's vicissitudes to feel a particular (if fleeting) empathy. However, we face a logical impasse. Presumably (and by witness of scripture), God has something in His Divine "Mind" that we call "a plan" or "a will." I take this to mean that at any given moment (from our perspective; if God is in fact atemporal than clearly moment is not the right word) God intends to accomplish or affect some determinate set of things in the world. There are then two possibilities:
A) our request is already a part of God's "plan" which He intends to carry out
B) it is not
The dilemma is evident. If our request is a part of God's "plan," then our asking Him to grant it is merely redundant, as the events we desire would have come to pass absolutely regardless of our intercession. This is of course an uninteresting but inexorable conclusion. Option (b), however, proves to produce a yield more provocative. What does it mean for us to pray for something that is not in God's will? As mentioned in premise II above, God is as benevolent as a being can possibly be. This implies that He possesses a far more caring disposition towards the creature or Being (including, I must cede to the Calvinists, Himself) which is the beneficiary of our entreaty than we ourselves possibly can at any given moment in time.
Therefore, it stands to reason, it would seem, that if there were some event which God could bring about to improve the condition of the Being in question, He would by his own will, by dint of his own Love, carry it out. The situation is analogous to that by means of which Luther decried Papal authority over purgatory: if the Pope COULD free souls from purgatory, why wouldn't he do it out of love instead of requiring the purchase of indulgences? The question for God is the same. If He knows that something is good for someone, why would it not be part of His plan to bring it about, motivated by naught but His intrinsic compassion? However, I get ahead of myself, as two distinct possibilities must be delineated and discussed. They are as follows:
B-I) the request in question is in fact desirable for the person who is its beneficiary (i.e. would bring about a state of affairs beneficial to them)
B-II) the requested situation merely appears ameliorating with respect to the person in question from our perspective, but in fact (for some reason that only God is at this time privy to) is not
If B-I obtains, then the previous question stands: why would not God already have factored the bringing about of the beneficial situation into his Divine plan, since He wills what is best for all?
if B-II obtains, we must assume that we are making an inappropriate request because of our ignorance, and that God in His mercy should refuse us our request, so as to actually improve upon the conditions of the object of our concern in a way that remains to us shrouded in divine mystery. it is clear that if A obtains, there was no reason for us to pray, as all would surely be well because of God's benevolent planning. B-I could not obtain, because it would violate premise II above, namely that God is wholly benevolent. Thus, the only possibility for meaningful prayer must be located in those situations in which B-II obtains. Now this is clearly
absurd. It leaves us with the disquieting conclusion that the only possible result of our prayers, which would alter the resultant states of the world in any meaningful way, is to bring about a state of affairs which was not previously a part of God's plan for the precise reason that it would in fact be detrimental to the being whose succor was its very motivation. Thus, if we take seriously the claim that God actually considers our petitions and sometimes deigns to grant us what we request despite its not being to our ultimate benefit, praying for someone becomes a purely malicious act. A prayer said on someone's behalf, so long as it asks for a determinate happening in a particular situation (as opposed to a general invocation such as "may You be glorified in this situation" or "be merciful to her oh Lord," the actual meaning of which appears to be something like "do whatever You intended to do and you have my full support") can only meaningfully serve to bring upon them an unfavorable circumstance with a prima facie (but misleading) appearance of good. It then seems evident that making a request to an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God can only serve to occasionally persuade Him, as a merciful concession, to intervene in the world in such a way as to make life somewhat (though hopefully not exceedingly) less pleasant and tolerable for us and those we love.

aetiology

now i confess that there's no actual necessity of my starting an online blog, since i'm still in college, have frequent contact with most of my friends, and have an amount of free time which is more than adequate to the task of maintaining correspondence with those who have the misfortune of having sojourned great distances and having recourse to naught but e-mail as their means communication. the simple fact is that i have, with a surprising degree of consistency, proved far more lazy than one (myself at least) might have reasonably suspected, and my negligence has been the cause of no small ignorance on the parts of my distant acquaintances regarding the various goings-on of my quotidian affairs. to this end i begin this blog. secondarily, of course, i intend to use it as a means of ranting about the issues plaguing my poor troubled mind, and for this reason i may never actually tell anyone (since i have difficulty imagining anyone will care) that it exists, and use it simply as a form of journaling which does not in any immediate way threaten my lamentably constructed sense of 'marlboro' masculinity